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The Evolution of the Problem of Freedom is the first course Bergson taught as 
the chair in the “History of Modern Philosophy” at the Collège de France. He 
replaced the philosopher and sociologist Gabriel Tarde, to whom Bergson 
pays homage in the opening part of the first lecture. Bergson had previously 
taught for four years at the Collège de France as the chair in the “History of 
Ancient Philosophy.” 
 For this first course, Bergson chose a theme that he placed at the very 
center of his first book, Time and Free Will (Essai sur les donnée immédiates de la 
conscience): freedom. Therefore, it’s not surprising that we find in the 1904–
1905 course a certain number of analyses which had been developed in 1888, 
such as the constitutive but positive indefinability of freedom,1 and the partial 
character—“conventional” or rather “symbolic”2—of the principle of the 
conservation of energy.3 
 But, these developments are, on the one hand, enriched and 
reconfigured from the inside by what Bergson had learned in the time since 
the publication of Time and Free Will (in particular, as developed in 
“Introduction to Metaphysics” in 1903, the oppositions between analysis and 
intuition, simplicity from the interior viewpoint and complexity from the 
external viewpoint). On the other hand, these developments are supported by 
new theoretical advances often called upon with great success in the later 
directions of this philosophy. 
 First of all, one thinks of the analyses which fill the pages of Creative 
Evolution. Bergson’s conception of this book is already far along and the 
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courses from this period (from the first courses in 1900 up to those of 1906–
1907 on the question of the will) are something like a laboratory for Creative 
Evolution. Of course, Bergson presents reflections on the question of life—life 
increasingly constitutes a viewpoint that has to be occupied in order to 
appreciate the philosophical issues laid out earlier, such as time or 
consciousness. There is thus, as one of the last lectures will say in a 
magnificent way, an intermediary term between the absolute knowledge we 
have of our interior life and the relative knowledge we have of exteriority: this 
is the knowledge we have of life since it is, literally, knowledge of an “internal 
relation.”4 The same thing holds for the interpretations and readings of past 
philosophies he presentsreadings which, as the background for a “philosophy 
of the history of philosophy” (both as becoming and as method) which itself 
is in the process of being developed here5—since, after all, a course called “The 
Evolution of the Problem of Freedom” studies essentially (but not exclusively) 
prior doctrines.6 We inevitable notice this each time we examine a course by 
Bergson at the Collège de France, during this period of his career, concerning 
a theme in the history of philosophy. The extremely condensed comments, 
condensed so much that they might look random or hasty, in the section of 
the fourth chapter of Creative Evolution, which casts “a glance at the history of 
systems,”7 are actually the ultimate condensation— whose details therefore 
have received thorough reflection—of the coherent and substantial 
developments presented to this audience at the Collège de France. 
 However, a surprise awaits the reader of the 1904–1905 course at the 
Collège de France. We are surprised to see, in certain investigations which 
Bergson engaged in very early, a great proximity—indicating a tremendous 
creative consistency, and sometimes as far as stating the same formulas 
themselves—between “The Evolution of the Problem of Freedom” and The 
Two Sources of Morality and Religion, which was published in 1932. For 
example, you will read a long and magnificent philosophical portrait of 
Socrates, seen as the first of all the philosophers to have had the intuition 
(Bergson does not hesitate to say this), the intuition of freedom. And already 
here, as he will be twenty-five years later, Socrates is considered to be the 
bearer of a kind of mystical emotion, which in him would come to double 
philosophical rationality.8 
 In the study initiated in the second lecture on the affective roots of the 
human belief in destiny, you will also find the first elements of what will 
constitute an important part, by its length and by its significance, of the 
second chapter of The Two Sources. In the second chapter, we find the critical 
debate with Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and the theoreticians of the notion of 
“primitive mentality.”9 In the last lectures, you will read developments 
devoted to Rousseau (understood through the Social Contract and especially 
Emile). Rousseau is an author whom we have every reason to believe has 
general similarities to Bergson, but whom Bergson hardly mentions 
throughout his published works. The one exception is a beautiful page on 
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Rousseau near the end of The Two Sources, which seems to be directly inspired 
by what Bergson says while he is standing in front of his audience in 1905.10 
 Like every publication of this kind, we also discover analyses—and this 
is perhaps the main interest in this Bergson course—which are found nowhere 
else in his works such as they are known to us to this day. The illuminating 
power that these analyses have in regard to his work and likewise their 
philosophical power of suggestion is considerable. For example, there’s the 
historical thesis which claims that, to the extent that the intellectual 
conception of necessity becomes consolidated and rigid by means of scientific 
and metaphysical evolutions, our intuitive belief in freedom comes to be 
unwavering and intensified. Here are some other examples of analyses not 
found in his published works: the original way he poses the problem of 
contingent futures (presented through a study of Aristotle’s treatise, On 
Interpretation) and the illustration (which is, so to speak, being actualized here) 
of the way that the intuition of duration leads us inevitably to reconsider 
logical principles (and in particular that of the excluded middle); a 
reconsideration, which strictly has to follow, of the relation affirmation and 
negation maintain in philosophy—a philosophical thesis being able to be 
positive in its grammatical aspect, and yet negative in its argumentative 
intention; conversely,11 a radical and consistent reading of Descartes’s “I 
think,” thereby allowing the Cartesian priority of the will over the 
understanding in God as in humanity to achieve its full potential; and a 
Plotinian reading of Spinozism somewhat out of sync with the one finally 
proposed in Creative Evolution in 1907. In this course on the problem of 
freedom, Spinoza will be less a follower of Plotinus than of Aristotle. 
 Each time we read one of these courses (reproduced word by word by 
the Corcos brothers, who were legal stenographers for Charles Péguy who 
was unable to be at the courses),12 we think we hear Bergson’s own voice at 
times, still endowed with all the characteristics of a sonority coming from 
someone alive and therefore capable of moving us. Near the end of the first 
lecture, Bergson declares, “They are nearly the same formulas but there is 
something else. It’s—how to express this—it’s something like the feeling of 
freedom taking on a greater and greater importance.” Here he brings into 
focus for us, by extending it, the exact formula in regard to a Kantian moral 
intuition which would differ profoundly from that of Rousseau. In editing this 
course, our aim has been to allow us to hear Bergson’s intonations, about 
which he says himself that they are, in philosophy, inseparable from the 
content.13 
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